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Abstract
It is argued that colour name strategy, object name strategy, and
chunking strategy in memory are all aspects of the same general phe-
nomena, called stereotyping, and this in turn is an example of a know-
how representation. Such representations are argued to have their
origin in a principle called the minimum duplication of resources. For
most the subsequent discussions existence of colour name strategy suf-
fices. It is pointed out that the Berlin-Kay universal partial ordering
of colours and the frequency of traffic accidents classified by colour are
surprisingly similar; a detailed analysis is not carried out as the specific
colours recorded are not identical. Some consequences of the existence
of a name strategy for the philosophy of language and mathematics
are discussed: specifically it is argued that in accounts of truth and
meaning it is necessary throughout to use real numbers as opposed
to bivalent quantities; and also that the concomitant label associated
with sentences should not be of unconditional truth, but rather sev-
eral real valued quantities associated with visual communication. The
implication of real valued truth quantities is that the Continuum
Hypothesis of pure mathematics is side-stepped, because real val-
ued quantities occur ab initio. The existence of name strategy shows
that thought/sememes and talk/phonemes can be separate, and this
vindicates the assumption of thought occurring before talk used in
psycholinguistic speech production models.
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2 Introduction
2.1 Motivation
Name strategy is a type of deployment of a representation whose relation-
ship to other and general representations is shown by the hierarchial dia-
gram 2.2 below. Name strategy has particularly well-defined features clar-
ifying the related properties of other entries in the diagram. Roughly the
entries in the diagram can be explained as follows. Representation has no
all-encompassing formal definition. In artificial intelligence it roughly means
a set of conventions about how to describe things; it is a loose term to be
kept in mind when creating programs, languages etc., which entails keeping
track of how knowledge or data or anything else is codified and whether
this involves some condensation of the original material. It splits into two
parts: i)know-that representations - usually these hold factual knowledge or
data, and typically are the subject of information theory, ii) and know-how
representations - usually these hold inference knowledge in the form of pro-
grams and languages, and typically are the subject of instruction theory.
For animals, as opposed to machines, representation again means the cod-
ified form of knowledge and data; again it splits into two parts: know-that
representations which are stores of encyclopedic knowledge, and know-how
representations which are essentially skills that can be deployed. Stereotyp-
ing loosely means collating information into a labeled set or template which
can be readily (re-)used; properly this is cognitive stereotyping as opposed
to social stereotyping, Stewart et al (1979) [43]. Examples of this are ac-
tions such as walking; an example which allows quantitative measurements
is memory chunking, the existence of which has been readily demonstrated
by many experiments. Name strategy means associating a given word with a
stereotype. This splits into two types: i) where the word activates a switch,
the switch is perhaps innate, another example of a switch is pro-drop in
linguistics, ii)where there is no switch. The paradigmatic, and best studied,
example of the first of these is colour name strategy; in which the focal
colours are progressively labeled by names as a culture advances until all
eleven are named. Object name strategy is an example of the second. The
purpose of the present paper is to describe the empirical justification for
these representations and their implications for psychology, philosophy, and
mathematics.
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2.2 Diagram
2.2 Diagram: Name Strategy in the Representation Hierarchy
Representations
/ \
/ \
/ \
\/ \/
Know-how Representations Know-that Representations
\
\
\
\/
Stereotyping
/ \
/ \
/ \
\/ \
Name Strategy \
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ \ \
\/ \/ \/
Colour Name Strategy Object Name Strategy Memory Chunking
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2.3 Sectional Contents
Section I establishes a framework which allows discussion of the nature of
representations; it is advocated that there is minimal duplication of these.
The existence of colour name strategy is discussed in section 3. The simi-
larity of the idea of adopting a name strategy and creating a representation
discussed in section 2.4. Colour name strategy is taken to be the paradig-
matic case of stereotyping and the relationships of object name strategy
and chunking to it are discussed in sections 4 and 5 respectively. Whenever
colour name strategy is deployed it illustrates that thought can exist with out
words and in principle allows a qualitative measure of this. In section 6 it is
noted that the Berlin-Kay universal partial ordering for colours is similar to
the frequency that traffic accidents occur for a car of a given colour. Section
8 continues, from Roberts (1998) [34], my approach to radical interpretation.
This theory and how I differ from the traditional approach is summarized
in section 10.1. Name strategy suggests at least three problems with radical
interpretation, they are: i) the reduced accuracy problem, which is: Why
have two colour names instead of one as this can reduce accuracy? ii) the
segmentation problem, which is: How does a theory of meaning account for
the real numbers, or why is the Continuum Hypothesis of mathematics
justified? iii) the extralinguistic assignment problem, which is: traditional
radical interpretation requires extralinguistic information in order to assign
truth values to bivalent statements; the extralinguistic assignment prob-
lem asks: what is the correct concomitant label (or flag) associated with
statements and how is it induced? In section 7 it is pointed out that psy-
cholinguistic speech production models require a-priori structure from which
speech is produced. The example of an interacting speech production model
is investigated, here the starting point is a word in quotation marks which
represents the meaning of a word. It has long been argued by philosophers
that a word in isolation has ambiguous meaning, so that there is the problem
of why it is justifiable to start with the meaning of a word in isolation. It is
here argued that the existence of name strategy indicates the independence
of thought and talk, and thus vindicates the assumption of psycholinguistic
speech models, namely that there is a starting point in production which is
independent of words. Section 10.2 is the conclusion.
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2.4 Stereotypes Compared to Other Representations
The properties of colour name strategy are that it is a stereotype which in
addition: i) has eleven switches, see section 3.1, ii) is culturally determined,
see section 3.1, and iii)is encapsulated. Encapsulation means that once the
stereotype has been created it cannot be adjusted and that its modes of
interaction are few and in principle determined: encapsulation results in
a higher speed of processing. Object name strategy section 4 and mem-
ory chuncking section 5 are stereotypes which: i) are not switched, ii) are
determined by the environment, iii) are encapsulated. How does what is
here called a stereotype compare to other representations? Semantic rep-
resentations, Shannon (1988) [40], are essentially codified and condensed
information which is meant to encompass the “meaning” of a portion of lan-
guage. Shannon argues that they are not a primary structure, this suggests
that there is no switching and meaning (in the form of semantic represen-
tations) is stored in a similar way to object perception. Way (1991) [47]
allows knowledge representations to be general enough to include metaphor.
At this point what a representation is becomes entangled with what mean-
ing is. My view is that “meaning” is too general and nebulous a term to pin
down in this way, aspects of “meaning” must be involved in colour name
strategy, the best thing to do is classify aspects of meaning and see what sort
of representation they entail. Visual perception entails perceiving objects,
and so contains object perception as discussed in section 4; Farah (1988) [11]
discusses whether visual imagery engages some of the same representations
as used in visual perception. She finds neuropsychological evidence which
suggests that some representations are used for both purposes. This dual
purpose or multiuse of visual representations is similar to the multiuse of
names in name strategy. Irrespective of whether representations are innate,
the variety of use to which a given representation can be put suggests that
there are general principles involving the creation and operation of repre-
sentations.
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2.5 Minimal Duplication of Resources
Why do nervous systems in animals produce representations? An answer is
that by holding a representation an animal does not have to do the same
processing of information again and again. Indeed repeated information
processing might be the method by which many representations are created;
for example Jeannerod (1994) [20] repeated actions seem to improve motor
control, in the words of Decety et al (1994) [8]
Mental practice involves rehearsal of neural pathways related to
cognitive stages of motor control.
Other examples which suggest that the representations used in imagination
are the same as those received externally are: i) the dual visual represen-
tations discussed by Farah (1988) [11], see the previous section 2.4, and ii)
the combined use of visual and auditory imagery when reading to oneself.
The principle of minimum duplication stands in stark contrast to the ideas
of modularity where for example there is no visual and auditory interaction
until the information reaches the “cognitive center”. Strict modularity is
in any case unlikely for many reasons, three of which are: i) the interac-
tion of seeing and hearing words McGurk and McDonald (1976) [28], ii) the
orienting motor response which occurs at the third relay in human audi-
tory processing Garman (1990) [13] p.62, iii) Frog ”bug-perceivers” Garman
(1990) [13] p.69, appear already to occur in the retina before any subsequent
visual information processing occurs. The principle of minimum duplication
is a minimality requirement in the same way as Ockam’s razor (requiring the
minimal explanation for scientific data) in the philosophy of science, however
ultimately it might be possible to formulate it as a minimality requirement
like the principle of least action in physics.
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3 Name Strategy in Colour Perception
3.1 Berlin-Kay Colour Ordering
The perception of colour often involves the deployment of a colour name
strategy. The effect of this is to alter the way the colour is perceived. The
five principles of colour perception have been given by Brown (1976) [3]:
1. The communicability of a referent in an array and for a par-
ticular community is very closely related to the memorability of
that referent in the same array and for members of the same
community.
2. In the total domain of colour there are eleven small focal ar-
eas in which are found the best instances of the colour categories
named in any particular language. The focal areas are human
universals, but languages differ in the number of basic colour
terms that they have; they vary from two to eleven.
3. Colour terms appear to evolve in a language according to the
Berlin-Kay (1969) [1] universal partial ordering:
/ \
/ \ --[green]-[yellow]-- |purple|
|white| / \ |pink |
| |->-[red]-- -[blue]-[brown]->-|orange|
|black| \ / |grey |
\ / --[yellow]-[green]-- \ /
4.Focal colours are more memorable, easier to recognize, than
any other colours, whether the subjects speak a language having
a name for the colour or not.
5.The structure of the colour space determined by multi-dimensional
scaling of perceptual data is probably the same for all human
communities and it is unrelated to the space yielded by naming
data.
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3.2 The Sapir-Worf Hypothesis
The five principles of colour perception can be used to test formulations of
the Sapir-Worf hypothesis. This hypothesis is sometimes formulated Brown
(1976) [3], and Kay and Kempton (1984) [21] as three separate hypotheses
S-W.I Structural differences between languages will, in general,
be paralleled by non-linguistic cognitive differences, of an un-
specified sort, in the native speakers of the two languages.
S-W.II The structure of anyones native language strongly influ-
ences the world view he will acquire as he learns the language.
S-W.III The semantic system of different languages vary with-
out constraint.
3.3 Name Strategy
Kay and Kempton (1984) [21] p.75 define colour name strategy as follows:
According to the [colour] name strategy hypothesis, the speaker
who is confronted with a difficult task of classificatory judgement
may use the LEXICAL classification of the judged objects as if it
were correlated with the required dimension of judgement even
when it is not, so long as the structure of the task does not block
the possibility.
What this essentially means is that for colour judgement tasks the word for
the colour may be deployed rather than the colour itself, provided that the
nature of the task allows for this. This use of the word for a colour rather
than the colour itself is a name strategy. The significance of name strategy
from a cultural point of view is that it allows S-W.I to be tested. This can
be done by using a language community in which all eleven focal colours
have not been identified so that the language users do not have the option
of deploying a name strategy. North American native languages have one
word for blue and green, this is referred to as “grue” - thus these speakers
do not have the possibility of deploying the words “blue” and “green” in
judgement tasks so that they can be used as controls. The scale of colour
differences between focal blue and focal green, for the purposes of perception
is measured not by wavelength, but by a previously ascertained difference
scale. Kay and Kempton’s experiments show that when the experiment
involves the words blue and green, English speakers consistently and mea-
surably assume colours near the blue/green boundary to be further toward
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the colour foci than they are; however when colour words do not occur this
does not happen. They conclude that a naming strategy is involved which
induces perceptual colour to move toward the colour foci.
3.4 Remarks On Colour Perception
The existence of name strategy as discussed above can be interpreted as
showing that thought can exist without words, but when words do occur they
can influence thoughts in a quantifiable way. The effect of moving away from
a difference boundary occurs not only in anthropology and psychology but
in life science also: Lack (1947) [22] points out that two heavy billed finches
Geospiza fortis and Geospiza fulinginasa, both have bills of approximately
equal size when they are the only heavy billed finch on an island, however
when they both occur on the same island the bill of one is much larger than
the other. Brown (1976) [3] p.152 after noting the existence of colour foci
universals and the above five properties of colour perception states
The fascinating irony of this research is that it began in a spirit of
strong relativitism and linguistic determinism and has now come
to a position of cultural universalism and linguistic insignificance.
This suggests the possibility that there are universal perceptions and that
it is the words superimposed upon them that enhance the cluster proper-
ties mentioned by Wittgenstein (1958) [49] p.31; such cluster properties are
characteristic of concept formation, see for example Hampton (1979) [14]
and Nuyts and Pederson (1997) [32], and occur not only for humans but
also for other animals, for example pigeons have a concept of what a tree
is, see for example Hernstein (1985) [15]. Note that, Scriven (1997) [37],
Black, Brown, White, Grey, and Green are prevalent surnames, but Blue,
Red, Yellow, and Purple are not; this seems to be also independent of the
Berlin-Kay ordering.
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4 Name Strategy in Object Perception
4.1 Object Perception
It has been noted by Carmichael, Hogan, and Walter (1932) [5], that lan-
guage has an effect on visually perceived forms. They constructed a number
of experiments involving drawn figures that are midway between two clearly
delineated objects, some of their examples include: a figure which is half
way between a crescent moon and the letter “c”, and a number which is half
way between a two and an eight, etc . . . . They claim on p.83, that their
experiments:
tend to substantiate the view that not the visual form alone, but
the method of its apprehension by the subject determines, at
least in certain cases, the nature of its reproduction.
and their final conclusion on p.83, is that:
to some extent at least, the reproduction of forms may be deter-
mined by the nature of the words presented orally to the subject
at the time that they are first perceiving specific visual forms.
An example of a similar effect is the ink-blot technique of making letters
ambiguous, Lindsay and Norman (1972) [24], this involves part of a letter in
a display of a word being obliterated by an ink-blot; the presence of the rest
of the word disambiguates (i.e. removes the ambiguity in the choice of letter)
the letter so that it is perceived as a letter which produces a word rather
than a non-word. In other words object name strategy is often deployed in
the apprehension of visual objects. In the view adopted here these are two
examples of the similar phenomena to that found in colour perception; to wit
when language is present it can adjust thought via a naming strategy. The
difference is that these two object perception examples are not switched; and
as they can be subject to subsequent adjustments they are not encapsulated
either.
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5 Memory Chunking
5.1 Recalling Re-coded Events
Short term memory has a capacity to re-call about seven distinct elements
of information, Miller (1956) [30]. Miller cites much evidence for this: from
sound perception, where untrained people have the ability to recognize about
six different pitches and five degrees of loudness; musically trained people can
recognize a greater number of distinct pitches. There are similar results for
the ability to recognize other uni-dimensional stimuli, which means a single
stimuli with out interference from other effects. For multi-dimensional stim-
uli, where there is more than one spectrum of features which distinguishes
a stimuli, there is a relationship between the number of stimuli present and
the number of objects that can be identified; inspection of Miller (1956) [30]
Fig.6 suggests that the number of objects that can be identified is propor-
tional to the hyperbolic tangent of the number of stimuli present. Miller
suggests that the mechanism by which this is achieved is by re-coding the
sequence of information into chunks, and this is referred to as a chunking
strategy; he says, Miller (1956) [30] p.93:
There are many ways to do this re-coding, but probably the
simplest is to group the input events, apply a new name to the
group, and then remember the new name rather than the original
events.
This re-coding strategy is chunking strategy in memory, which is here called
memory chunking. Memory chunking is not encapsulated as it is possible
for memories to suffer from subsequent interference. Memory chuncking is
not switched.
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5.2 Memory for Chinese Words and Idioms
This mechanism seems to be related to the naming strategy of the previ-
ous sections, the connection between the two effects is illustrated by the
study of short term memory capacity for Chinese words done by Zhang and
Simon (1985) [51]. Chinese written characters exist in two varieties, one
type of characters has a name the other does not. Zhang and Simon asked
some Chinese speakers to remember eight sets of the two sorts of characters.
The subjects could immediately recall about six characters with names, but
short term memory capacity for Chinese radicals not possessing common
pronounceable names is about two or three items. Thus short term memory
appears, on occasion, to adopt a name strategy similar to the name strat-
egy of the two proceeding sections; however the new name referred to by
Miller might not always be a specific word, it might be some other label. To
see this consider short term memory in musical performance, where what is
remembered may be specific notes, or a specific scale etc., chunking strat-
egy is still involved but it is not now a name strategy. Therefore the term
stereotyping is used to cover all three phenomena.
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6 The Implications for Traffic Accidents
6.1 Colour Perception and Traffic Accidents
Table: Rate of Involvement in Traffic Accidents of Cars by Colour.
Number of Accidents per 10,000 Cars.
Adapted from Table 7C.HMSO91.
Black White Red Blue Grey Gold Silver Other Beige Green Yellow Brown
176 160 157 149 147 145 142 139 137 134 133 133
Two-colour cars are classified by their main colour.
Other = Bronze,Pink,Orange,Purple,
Maroon,Turquoise,Multi-coloured,&Unknown.
The above table shows the rate, per 10,000 licensed cars, of accidents clas-
sified by colour. There is a striking resemblance of the three most accident
prone colours namely black, white, and red to the Berlin-Kay diagram; and
some resemblance among other colours, however accidents of blue cars seem
to be anomalously high compared to green, yellow, and brown cars. Munster
and Strait (1992) [31] note:
The data probably say more about differences in the types of car
and driver represented in the colour groups than differences in
the inherent safety of the car colours. It is possible that certain
colours are more popular among groups of drivers with a higher
risk of accident such as young drivers or company car users.
Some colours may tend to be associated with particular makes
and models of car. No doubt factors such as visibility also affect
accident risk, but it would be difficult to distinguish their effects
from those of the driver and vehicle, using the available data.
From the point of view presented in this paper, colours which have a greater
propensity to be involved in a colour name strategy are more likely to co-
incide with the colour of a car involved in an accident. To put this another
way: people who drive a car of a well-defined colour, are more likely to be
involved in an accident. There have also been studies into the connection
between personality type and car colour, Marston (1997) [26].
15
7 Implications for Psycholinguistics
7.1 The Interaction Model
There is evidence that the reception of speech is interactive, for example
there is evidence that seeing the speaker speak influences the word heard,
McGurk and McDonald (1976) [28]; also there is evidence that verbal speech
production interacts with gesture, McNeil (1985) [29], and various other
physiological activities Jacobson (1932) [19] p.692, and these observations
suggests that the verbal part of speech production is interactive. A model
which allows both phonological and semantic influences to interact is the psy-
cholinguistic interaction speech production model, c.f. Stemberger (1985)
[42]. In this model, when the word feather is activated a lot of other words
are also activated with varying weights according to how closely they resem-
ble feather. This can be described by the diagram Stemberger (1985) [42]
p.148 and text:
Semantic and phonological effects on lexical access. ...an arrow
denotes an activating link, while a filled circle is an inhibitory
link. A double line represents a large amount of activation, a
single solid line somewhat less, and a broken line even less. Some
of the inhibitory links have been left out... for clarity. The
exact nature of semantic representation is irrelevant here, beyond
the assumption that it is composed of features; ... a word in
quotation marks represents its meaning.
There is suppression (also called inhibition) across a level, and activation
up or down to the next level. This model accounts for syntax by giving
different weights to the different words so that words on the left come first.
Speech errors come from the noise in the system. There are three kinds of
noise. The first is that the resting level of a unit node is subject to random
fluctuations; with the result that it is not the case that the unit nodes degree
of activation remains at the base line level. A fluctuation could produce a
random production of a part of a word. The second is that words that are
used with a high frequency have a higher resting level, and therefore reach
activation threshold, or ”pop out”, quicker. This implies that there should
be less error for these high frequency words; furthermore it implies that when
real words occur as an error, higher frequency words should occur as errors
more often, and this does not happen. The third is the so-called systematic
spread of activation; this means that the weights in the interaction allow an
inappropriate activation of word.
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7.2 Serial and Connectionist Models
Serial models consist of a series of boxes arranged in strict order. These
process a message into language and then articulate it. The evidence cited
in section 2.5 and at the beginning of section 7.1 shows that serial language
perception and production is unrealistic. Serial models begin with a ”mes-
sage level”, Garret (1980) [12], and thus at the beginning requires thought,
in the form of semantic content, to exist without talk, in the form of tangi-
ble language. In connectionist models of language and word production, for
example Seidenberg and McClelland (1989) [38] p.527, the semantic aspects
of the model are put in by hand.
17
7.3 Language Production
The very words ”model of language production” assume that some starting
structure is metamorphosed into some finishing structure. In the present
case it is clear that the finishing structure is speech and other forms of
language, but it is not clear what the starting structure is. In other words,
what language is supposed to be produced from. Now we consider how
this appears to be done for serial, connectionist, and interactive models
respectively. In serial models, Garret (1980) [12], the starting structure is
the message level; here there are collections of amorphous thoughts which the
production process crystalizes into language. Now this begs an assumption,
because it implies that thought can exist prior to and/or independently of
words. There appears to be a lot of scope as to how meanings of words can
be accommodated within connectionistic models, for example Rumelhart
and McClelland (1986) [36] p.99 say:
there is an implicit assumption that word meanings can be rep-
resented as a set of sememes. This is a contentious issue. There
appears to be a gulf between the componential view in which
meaning is a set of features and the structuralist view in which
the meaning of a word can only be defined in terms of its re-
lationships to other meanings. Later ... we consider one way
of integrating these two views by allowing articulate represen-
tations to be built out of a number of different sets of active
features.
The componential view is a sort of correspondence theory of meaning, and
similarly the structuralist view a coherence theory of meaning, for definitions
of these terms see Roberts (1998) [34]. In interaction models the situation is
a more complex than in serial models; here the starting structure is a ”word
in quotation marks which represents its meaning” Stemberger (1985) [42]
p.148. This cannot really be a starting point because it requires that a word
has meaning in isolation, i.e. that context is irrelevant. It has been argued by
Frege, Davidson, and others that not only the material context but also the
context of a word in a sentence is necessary for an unambiguous assignment
of meaning to a word. An example of an ambiguous word is “bank”, what
sort of bank is being referred to can be disambiguated by a sentence or
perhaps some other source of information. An example of context ambiguity
is: “1st speaker to 2nd: Why don’t you become a philosopher?” 2nd speaker:
“Don’t have anything to do with philosphers, they are underhand.” 3rd
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speaker: “Why don’t you become a philosopher.” Sentence themselves are
often ambiguous because they contain ellipses and indexicals, again they
have to be dis-ambiguated by being put in the perspective of a wider context.
This gives rise to a “holistic” view of the meaning of a word, this has been
expressed by Davidson (1984) [7] p.22 as follows:
If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we
understand the meaning of each item in the structure only as an
abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it features,
then Frege says that only in the context of a sentence does a
word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added that
only in the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore
a word) have meaning.
Again it would appear that the starting structure is a thought; thus the
models all assume that a thought occurs first and is processed into words,
i.e. that thought and words are not identical, but are independent entities.
Davidson (1984) [7] addresses this question, however he seems just to be
concerned that if thought can occur without words, then this is also subject
to radical interpretation, for example on p.157:
the chief thesis of this paper is that a creature cannot have
thoughts unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another.
this suggests to me that Davidson thinks that words and thoughts are con-
comitant simultaneously.
7.4 Sememes and Phonemes verses Thought and Talk
The preceeding suggests that generally psychologists require sememes/thought
to exist independently and prior to phonemes/talk; whereas philosophers are
wary of thoughts existing independently. This is summed up by Wittgen-
stein’s remark on where one cannot speak one cannot think. This is perhaps
because of their different attitudes to studying communication. Psycholo-
gists are mainly concerned with explaining some particular aspect of lan-
guage. Philosophers are most interested in accuracy and rigour of thought,
if these are not written down they are hard to refute.
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7.5 Justification of Prior Thought
The assumption of the models, namely that thought can exist without words,
is justified for at least five reasons. The first is because of the existence of
the tip of the tongue (TOT) phenomena, Brown and McNeill (1966) [4].
This occurs when people appear to be at a loss for the word that they
are looking for. The second is because of the nature of musical instrument
tuition, where it is possible to think about phrasing, etc . . . , without recourse
to words; this is contrary to Davidson’s assertion, that a creature cannot
have thoughts unless it is an interpreter, quoted at the end of section 8.3,
irrespective of whether musical conventions and performance are subject
to radical interpretation, simply because notes are not speech. The third
is that animals have brains and so are able, at least to some extent, to
have something similar to thoughts, see for example Terrace (1985) [45] and
Premack (1988) [33]. The fourth is semantic amnesia studies, DeRenzi et
al (1987) [9]; their patient L.P. appears to have selective damage which
suggests that semantics and phonetic are separable, for example on p.579:
The linguistic performance of L.P. was marked by a striking dis-
sociation between impairment of semantic knowledge and the
preservation of phonetic, grammatic, and syntactic rules.
The fifth and clearest reason is because of the existence of name strategy,
this not only shows that thoughts can exist independently of words, but
futhermore colour name strategy allows quantitative statements of the de-
gree of independence to be made; in colour name strategy there is a per-
ceived movement away from the boundary between colours, and the amount
of this movement could provide such a measure. There is the question of
the temporal order of the independence, thought before talk seems to be the
assumption of speech production models and seems to occur, but there is
the possibility of the reverse which can be facetiously put as talking without
thinking. In colour perception the existence of a switched focal colour word
in a speakers repertoire adjusts the perception of colour, so that it appears
that talk, in the form of name strategy, can occur prior to thought.
20
8 Implications of for the Philosophy of Language
8.1 Radical Interpretation
Philosophy of language is concerned with how language has meaning. A
current view, Davidson (1984) [7] is that meaning is obtained through radical
interpretation of sentences; or perhaps, Lewis (1974) [23] a larger structure.
Radical interpretation optimizes the correspondence between language and
the world and also the self-consistency (or coherence) of the language. I have
given an outline of some aspects of my approach to it in Roberts (1998) [34]
and this section follows on from there. In section 3 it was shown that the
existence of a colour name strategy reduces the correspondence between
the true colour of a chip and its perceived colour; thus language does not
help the mind in producing an accurate representation corresponding to
the world, in fact in hinders it. In other words the use of a more polished
language is obscuring truth. The assignment of truth values to statements
is essential in the traditional picture of radical interpretation. Thus the
question arises: is the existence of name strategy compatible with a modified
form of radical interpretation, and if so exactly how is it necessary to change
radical interpretation?
8.2 Accuracy of Correspondence
A specific and neat illustration of the dilemma is posed by the question: Why
have two words “Blue” and “Green” when all they achieve is a less accurate
representation of the colours present? This is part of a question that can
be successively generalized to include other colours; also it is related to why
have memory chunking when this might cause a slight loss of accuracy, and
furthermore as to why have stereotyping in general. A point to note is that
usually these classifications are unconscious, and that this allows them to
occur at great speed - thus aiding swift communication.
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8.3 Quantity of Transferred Information when in Re-coded
Form
The answer to the dilemma is that it allows a large amount of information
to be communicated, even though there is a small cost in accuracy. It might
be more accurate to not have separate words for blue and green, and then
to indulge in lengthy comparisons every time a distinction between blue and
green objects is required; but if large amounts of information is to swiftly
communicated it is beneficial to have two separate words. For example, it
is advantageous for a language community to be able to say: ”Blue Gavagai
are tasty, but Green Gavagai are poisonous” rather than: ”Gavagai that
are grue like the sky are tasty, but Gavagia that are grue like the grass are
poisonous.”. More formally, for a specific case of colour perception 3.1, the
first principle, which states that the communicability of a referent is related
to its memorability, illustrates the mechanism by which larger quantities of
information can be more quickly communicated. A name strategy is chosen
so that a large amount of information about the colour of an object can
be easily remembered; and also be quickly and memorably communicated,
despite the fact that it incurs a loss in the accuracy and truth of statements.
Thus economy of expression accounts for the use of one word instead of
two. There is still the problem of why there are the eleven switched colour
perception centers. Why not have ten or fifteen switches colours, or none at
all? These are human universals as given by the second principle of colour
perception. A possible explanation is that the switched colours provide a
framework within which a huge number of colours can be described. No
switches would not give this framework. The reason that there are eleven
of them might be that this is the maximum number that the brain can
implement.
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8.4 Circuitous Correspondence
The foregoing presents a problem for the philosophy of language; because it
shows that words are only in indirect correspondence with the world. This
problem is approached by attempting to explain indirect correspondence by
using standard techniques and seeing if these lead to a plausible explana-
tion; the attempt consist of requiring that indirect correspondence is really
a circuitous correspondence. By this is meant a pair {D,P}. D is a direct
correspondence and P a procedure with which the indirect correspondence
I can be recovered. Notationally this could be expressed as D&P → I.
The usual view of radical interpretation requires that sentences are biva-
lent, or two-valued; this means that the truth values ”True” or the truth
value ”False” can be assigned to them. Here the possibility of assigning any
quantity to (or labeling, or marking, or tagging . . . ) sentences is referred to
them as being flagged. The existence of a name strategy, especially in colour
perception, shows that there is no unique way of achieving this; for exam-
ple, quantitative experiments could be constructed in which subjects would
be required to state how blue or green a chip is, the quantitative results
would depend on whether a name strategy was being deployed, then true
or false sentences could be constructed to describe these quantitative dif-
ferences, but these would have different truth values depending on whether
a name strategy was being deployed. This ambiguity of truth values ne-
cessitates that a disambiguating procedure (i.e. a procedure which removes
any amgibuity) be given. The form that such a procedure could take is the
re-writing, hopefully in a bounded finite number of steps B, of the original
sentences which are bivalent. An example of a re-writing procedure is what
is here called a brittle re-write procedure. This can be described as follows:
suppose that sentences can be given a single definite value, c.f. Urquhart
(1986) [46], of say:
U = {false, almostfalse, almosttrue, true}; (1)
then the original set of sentences can be replaced by a larger set of sentences
having just the values true or false, this can be done by posing the four
additional sentences: ”The previous sentence is False, Almost False, Almost
True, True” all four of which are true or false. Another example, is to
suppose that, instead of the sentences being bivalent it is possible to assign
a set of labels or quantities Q to a sentence, for instance
Q = {Happy and Good,Happy and Bad, Sad and Good, Sad and Bad};
(2)
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again for additional sentences, such as: ”The previous sentence has the
quality Q”, can be constructed which are bivalent. This approach really
falls under the scope of Davidson’s (1984) [7] p.133 program, it is just the
requirement that there should be a procedure for matching sentences without
logical form (i.e. bivalent sentence) the gerrymandered part of a language
where sentences do have logical form. It might be thought straightforward,
for the circuitous correspondence of colours, to implement such a procedure;
however first two problems have to be overcome. The first is that the re-write
procedure would involve real variables, the parameters P to be adjusted,
such as wavelengths, take values V on the real line ℜ , i.e.V (P )εℜ; however
it seems reasonable to assume that sentences and truth values can only be
stated and assigned sequentially, so that the total number of truth values
available N(T ) is an integer valued quantity, i.e.N(T )εZ ; thus there is
the problem of how to segment V (P ) so that N(T ) covers all cases, this
is an example of the segmentation problem, discussed in section 9.1. The
second is that the re-write procedure has to be constructed post-hoc, after
data about responses has been given, but extralinguistic assignment (or
flagging) of truth values to sentences is immediate; this is an example of
the extralinguistic assignment problem discussed in section 8.5. These two
problems suggest that the traditional view of radical interpretation needs
radical revision.
8.5 The Extralinguistic Assignment Problem
In order for radical interpretation to work various principles, such as the
principle of charity, have to be assumed. I have previously, Roberts (1998)
[34] explained my version of this which I called cooperation dominance.
These principles contain the idea that people communicate truthfully more
often than not, and that details of their behaviour give indications of the
truthfulness of their communication; hence it is possible to use extralinguis-
tic information to assign the truth values to sentences. These principles can
be modified so that real valued measures of truth are assigned, instead of
just the bivalent assignment of
B = {true, false}. (3)
However a problem arises because the existence of a name strategy shows
that, at the time an apparently true statement is uttered the quantity of
truth is not optimal; that the statement is apparently true is post hoc as
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it assumes that the listener posses the information, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to transcribe it to the relevant true statement. A way that this
could be accommodated in the usual theory is be requiring that the tran-
scription process is contained in the passing theory of the language; but then
it seems hard to justify referring to the extralinguistic information assigned
as being ”truth”. A better description is to assume that the extralinguistic
assignment is of relevant information, c.f. Sperber and Wilson (1987) [41];
the traditional case is a sub-case of this, as most relevant information is
true, but also it is possible to state irrelevant true statements. That truth
is not the only quality needed for facility of communication has been noted
by Church (1956) [6] p.2-3
For purposes of logic to employ a specially devised language,
a formalized language as we shall call it, which shall reverse
the tendency of the natural languages and shall follow or repro-
duce the logical form [here having the restricted meaning that
statements can be assigned bivalent truth values rather than be
flagged by a formal system] - at the expense, where necessary, of
brevity and facility of communication.
It is, see the P-model Roberts (1998b) [35], possible to quantify information,
but quantifying relevant information presents problems, perhaps the vehe-
mence or Fregian force with which a sentence is stated could lead to such
quantification. Flagging by Fregian force is unrealistic as it implies that by
shouting louder makes a statement more true, a better flag is relevant infor-
mation. Relevant information is discussed in the commentary on Sperber
and Wilson (1987) [41]. The above relates meaning to relevant information,
supposing that relevant information is frequently used in communication
relates meaning to use, compare Wittgenstein (1958) [49] p.43
For the word ’meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language.
8.6 Flagging by Countenance
What is the nature of the concomitant flagging which occurs when a state-
ment is uttered? The most important aspect of such flagging must be in
the comparison with the passing theory of the language to preserve coher-
ence (interior flagging); however at sometime exterior flagging must occur.
Flagging occurs for purely auditory statements, for example a tape or tele-
phone. This flagging is typically of the mood, age, and sex of the speaker,
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and seems to give information in addition to statements rather than be an
aid to comprehension. The main component of flagging for comprehension
is probably visual. Boyle, Anderson, and Newlands (1994) [2] show that
having a visible speaker improves the efficiency of dialog and that this is
more marked for young or inexperienced speakers. This suggests that the
extralinguistic information required is at least in part conveyed by the visual
acts of the speaker; as is it more marked for people learning the language
more extralinguistic information is required here. Clearly some of visual
information is in the form of demonstrable acts
D = {pointing out left/right, up/down etc. . . . }, (4)
and gesture emphasis. These could be used for flagging in the form
Q = {degree of emphasis, spatial and temporal location, . . . }, (5)
but it is not clear where this list would end or the relative importance of its
components. A neater way is to note that one of the main components of
visual communication are facial expressions, and these can be considered as
contenders for the flags assigned. Of course it is possible to combine these
with flags such as the above but with a loss of simplicity. The advantage
of using facial expressions can be taken to convey the most relevant infor-
mation is that Etcoff and Magge (1992) [10] find only five or six emotions
that faces express: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and perhaps sur-
prise. Flagging using these five or six emotions produces an assignment of
extralinguistic information called flagging by ℜ6 facial countenance. Thus
an alternative to sentences being assigned bivalent truth values or measures
of unspecific relevant information, they can be assigned six real values
Q = {happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise}. (6)
These can be expressed in ascii smilies
Q = { : −) , : −(, : −F, : −t, : −∗, : −s}
= { happy smilie, sad smilie, bucked− tooth vampire with one tooth missing,
cross smilie , ate something sour smilie, smilie after a bizzare comment}. (7)
Thus six real valued flags replace replace the one integer valued flag
Q = {truth}. (8)
This assignation taken to be the driving force behind the optimization of
correspondence between language and the world and hence radical interpre-
tation.
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9 Implications for the Philosophy of Mathematics
9.1 The Continuum Hypothesis and the Segmentation Prob-
lem
In mathematics there is an assumption: the Continuum Hypothesis see
for example Maddy (1993) [25] and Hirsch (1995) [16], that mathematical
objects can have continuous properties. A major place where this hypothesis
appears is that real numbers cannot be constructed from rational numbers
necessitating a new assumption for real number construction. An example
of such an assumption is given by Dedekind’s axiom of completeness, see for
example Issacs (1968) [18]. Hirsch (1995) [16] p.146 notes as a possibility
that
(b) Neurologists and psychologists learn enough about cell as-
semblies and cognition to make it scientifically certain that there
could not possibly be any activity in the nervous system which
would correspond to a truth value for the Continuum Hypothe-
sis.
What is about to be advocated here is something along these lines, essen-
tially it is argued that both truth and meaning are intrinsically real valued.
The segmentation problem is the problem of how to account for the existence
of and meaning attributed to the real numbers. From the point of view of
traditional radical interpretation the number of times truth can be assigned
to natural language statements is integer valued, and so does not allow for
real numbers. There are three parts to this problem:
i) how to account for the fact that real numbers as pure mathematical con-
structs have meaning,
ii) how to account for the success, meaning, and use of real numbers in the
physical world,
iii) how to account for the success, meaning and use of real numbers in cog-
nitive science.
In the previous paragraph a simple example, which shows that the real num-
bers are necessary for assigning truth values, is given by colour name strat-
egy. Similar problems arise with many other correspondences between lan-
guages and the world, for example consider the statement: ’Jones is six feet tall’.
This is unverifiable, the statement for which truth-values can be assigned
is: ’Jones is six ± δ feet tall’ where δ is some error, usually of a sta-
tistical nature. It is normally taken that physical measurements are real
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valued quantities with real valued errors, and therefore the real numbers are
needed to describe the physical world. It could be argued that a theory of
everything (TOE) Taubes (1995) [44], would require that objects have only
discrete properties, say by having length a multiple of the Planck length
etc., but present quantum mechanics requires Hilbert spaces which in turn
require properties of the real numbers, so that a requisite TOE would have
to change this; in any case it seems unreasonable that philosophy of lan-
guage and mathematics should legislate the nature of fundamental physics.
A better reason for discarding the real numbers would be to assume that
humans have only a finite number of integer valued brain states, so that the
assignment of a finite number of truth values should suffice for the assign-
ment of meaning as perceived by the brain. The indications are that real
valued quantities are needed for describing cognition and hence brain states.
Three examples of this are:
i) the accumulator theory of how people learn to count Wynn (1992) [50]
p.323, this requires that people can perceive temporal duration, a real quan-
tity, and then when sufficient amount of this has accumulated set an integer
valued quantity one higher,
ii) a clock measuring real valued temporal duration is needed for many skills
involving timing Shaffer (1982) [39],
and iii)most perceptual models, Massaro and Friedman (1990) [27] involve
real valued quantities.
These three examples suggest that real valued quantities should be used for
describing brain states; however Hopfield (1984) [17] has shown that con-
tinuous neurons, which is what real neurons are, can often be described by
two-state McCullock-Pitts neurons, suggesting that for psychological mea-
surements bivalent quantities might suffice. The problem is in fact a worse
than just requiring real numbers for physical and psychological measure-
ments. Real numbers occur in pure mathematics and a general account of
meaning should account for meaning in such a-priori languages, because
apart from any other reason mathematics is good at describing the phys-
ical world, Wigner (1960) [48]. It appears that the segmentation problem
does not have a solution involving only integers. The pure mathematical
reason for this is that accounting for the meaning of the real numbers can-
not be done by assigning an integer number of truth values, there is the
requirement of a new axiom when constructing ℜ. To put this another way
having discrete truth values is not sufficient, even with brittle re-write pro-
cedures, for ℜ to have meaning it must be possible to assign quantities Qεℜ
to sentences. To put this another way sentences cannot be flagged by integer
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valued quantities, they have to be flagged by real valued ones. In traditional
radical interpretation truth is an ab initio concept, for maximum compat-
ibility with this real valued generalizations of truth are required. Possible
choices for real valued truth are probabilities or fuzzy truth values.
9.2 Probabilistic and Fuzzy Tarski Truth Theory
Radical interpretation is in part motivated by Tarski’s truth theory. Usually
this applies bivalent truth values to formal languages. Church (1956) [6]
p.25 and by implication Davidson (1984) [7] p.19 seem to use the term
“logical form” where “bivalence” has been used here. In other words they
require integer valued flags, but here it is advocated that real valued flags are
necessary. There are formalized languages which do not require that truth is
bivalent but is real valued, examples of these are fuzzy logic and probability
theory. As has been argued in the previous section real values should be used
for describing truth in natural languages. There appears to be no reason why
Tarski’s truth theory cannot be modified to include statements which involve
probabilities or fuzzy truth values, although this appears not to have been
explicitly done in the literature. Instead of defining a relation: ”Assignment
a satisfies formula F in structure S: define a relation: ”Assignment a gives
formula F the value p in the structure S” in the probability case, p will be
a real number between 0 and 1.
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10 Summary
10.1 Peroration
So what does a speaker take a sentence such as ”Snow is white.” to mean?
Stripping away multitudinous provisos the essentially old view of radical
interpretation would be along the lines: “In a formal Tarski truth theory
the truth of such a statement would be ascertained by comparison with the
statement in another formal language. For learning a first natural language
with no language to compare it to, the truth of a previously unheard state-
ment is judged by seeing how well it matches the listeners previous model
of the language and the external information available. The external in-
formation available is taken more often than not to be useful rather than
misleading. Having judged a statement to be true the speaker then deduces
that it is in accurate correspondence to the exterior world. Having informa-
tion that accurately portrays the exterior world must entail knowing what
it means; meaning is implicated by the above reasoning and is a derivative
concept from it.” So how does the picture of radical interpretation presented
here differ? It differs in that truth is not a quantity that can be flagged to
sentences. The two reasons are: i) bivalent truth values could never account
for the meaning of the real numbers ℜ and the continuous properties that
they describe throughout human experience, ii) there appears to be little
psychological evidence that learners of a language flag sentences with truth
values other real valued quantities seem more likely. There are three main
consequences of this:
1) not only is meaning a derivative concept, truth is as well,
2) real numbers have to be introduced ab initio rather than be constructed
from the integers, integers are thought of as being a derivative concept,
3) perhaps in principle mathematical or computational models, or psycho-
logical data could test aspects of the above; hopefully it moves the theory
one step closer to being testable.
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10.2 Conclusion
In sections 3, 4, and 5 three distinct phenomena were discussed: in section
3 the phenomena was colour name strategy, this occurs only for the eleven
switched focal colours; in section 4 the phenomena was object name strat-
egy, this is not an identical phenomena to colour name strategy because
there is nothing which directly corresponds to the fixed number of switched
focal colours; in section 5 it was mentioned that memory chunking is aided
by the use of a name; these strategies are clearly related and it was ar-
gued that the relationship is that of the diagram 2.2 in the Introduction. It
was argued in 2.1 and 2.4 that all of these should be considered representa-
tions, and that representations should be hierarchically classified according
to their properties. In sections 8 and 9 some of the consequences of name
strategy for problems in the philosophy of language and mathematics were
outlined. These were summarized in subsection 10.1. The technical results
follow below: It was noted that having two colour words blue and green
aids swift communication although there can be a loss in accuracy. The
suggested solution to the segmentation problem was to require that real val-
ued quantities (as opposed to the traditional view where a single bivalent
quantity - truth) should be assigned to sentences and used throughout in
accounts of meaning. Thus the Continuum Hypothesis in mathematics
is evaded as it is only possible to have real valued truth. It was argued that
the extralinguistic assigned qualities, used in accounts of meaning, should
not be unconditional truth, but rather be flagged by information relevant to
comprehension, perhaps as signified by the six facial emotions; this is here
referred to as flagging by countenance. The existence of name strategy pro-
vides the clearest, of several, indication that thought and talk are separate
entities; this partially vindicates a hidden assumption in speech production
models 7, where it is not unambiguously stated what the starting structure
which speech is supposed to be produced from is.
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